CRIMINAL LAW-MAIL FRAUD-INTANGIBLE RIGHTS DOCTRINE
REJECTED AS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE

INTENT-McNally v.

United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
Increasing public intolerance of impropriety in political affairs within the last several decades has coincided with federal
law enforcement efforts to find criminal elements in such conduct.' The federal mail fraud statute 2 has been widely employed
in this regard.3 This act proscribes using the mails to further
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 4 It is now well-settled that there must be an
intentional mailing in furtherance of the plan. 5 However, the
requisite objective of the fraudulent scheme within the breadth of
the statute's prohibition has been articulated with less certainty
by the courts. 6 The relative absence of legislative, constitutional,
or judicial limits on the mail fraud act has permitted federal prosecutors to adopt a broad, literalistic reading of the act's language
to combat a vast range of deceitful activities otherwise outside
I See Baxter, FederalDiscretion in the Prosecution of Local PoliticalCorruption, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 321, 321-23 (1983) (discussing escalating federal law enforcement
efforts to prosecute corrupt local politicians).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
3 See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 771-73
(1980) ("[M]ail fraud has frequently represented the whole instrument of justice
that could be wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit.").
4 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange... for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin,
obligation, security . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or

artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by the mail ...any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
Id.
5 See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v.
Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 965 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977).
6 See, e.g., Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach,
20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423, 425 (1983). The author notes that "[m]eaningful judicial limitation on the statute's growth has been minimal. In short, the courts have
approved a functional definition of the statute in terms of the prosecutions the government has brought. They repeatedly have declined to articulate any bright line
boundaries of the concept of fraud." Id. at 425 (footnote omitted).
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the reach of federal jurisdiction.7 In the area of state and local
political corruption, prosecution under the mail fraud statute has
occurred despite the lack of tangible injury. 8
In the presence of extensive lower federal court interpretation of the mail fraud statute,9 the United States Supreme Court
recently examined the parameters of the nebulous "scheme ...
to defraud" language of the act.' ° In McNally v. United States,"
the Court considered whether the statute extends to deceptive
schemes in which the participants use the mails for personal advantage, yet do not deprive anyone of tangible property or economic value, but only of "intangible rights," such as the basic
right of citizens to honest government.' 2 By holding that the
mail fraud act reaches only those frauds which result in the deprivation of tangible property, the Court
declined to affirm the pre3
vious latitude accorded the statute.'
McNally involved a patronage scheme through which public
officials of the state of Kentucky and their political allies used
their influential positions to divert insurance commissions to
both themselves and their cronies.14 After Democrat Julian Carroll became Governor in 1974, he assigned Howard Hunt, state
democratic party chairman, de facto control over choosing the
agents from whom Kentucky would purchase workmens' compensation insurance.' 5 For several years prior to Carroll's election, the Wombwell Insurance Company of Lexington, Kentucky
(Wombwell) had performed this function for the state. 16 Pursu7 See Rakoff, supra note 3, at 772 (listing the various areas of fraud to which the
statute has been applied).
8 See United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 928 (1980). See generally Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and PoliticalCorruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562
(1980) (discrediting previously recognized support for the statute's application to
intangible corruption schemes).
9 See infra note 32 (citing lower federal court's interpretation of the mail fraud
statute).
10 See McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).

''

Id.

See id. at 2877.
Id. at 2881.
14 Id. at 2877.
15 Id. While normally this is the responsibility of the state insurance commissioner, the Governor delegated this authority to Hunt. Brief for the United States
at 3, McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987) (Nos. 86-234 & 86-286)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States].
16 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877. The designated agent, acting as a broker, would
purchase the insurance policies from a large underwriting insurance company,
which subsequently paid the agent commissions on a percentage basis. See id.
12
'3
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ant to an agreement between Hunt and Wombwell, the company
was permitted to continue functioning as the state's agent, provided it share commissions received from the underwriting insurers in excess of $50,000 per year with various insurance agencies
designated by Hunt.17
Anticipating the inception of this arrangement, Hunt and petitioner James Gray 18 established Seton Investments, Inc. (Seton), an insurance agency whose sole purpose was to benefit
from the commission-sharing scheme. 19 Seton was also ostensibly owned by petitioner Charles McNally, a private citizen and
political supporter of Governor Carroll.2 0 Seton received a large
portion of the diverted commissions during the four years the
arrangement was in effect. 2 ' The money was ultimately used for
the personal benefit of Hunt and Gray.2 2 Similarly, Wombwell
was directed to send payments to another company, the
Snodgrass Insurance Agency, which acted as a conduit and
passed the money on to McNally for his private use.2 3
In June of 1983, the petitioners were indicted for both mail
17 Id. At trial it was undisputed that the agencies who received shares of the
commission payments were chosen based on political patronage. See Brief for Petitioner Gray In No. 86-286, at 4, McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987)
(Nos. 86-234 & 86-286) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner Gray]. In fact, petitioner
Gray contended that such commission sharing arrangements are both lawful and
common:
[F]or instance, if a church seeks to obtain a liability insurance policy that
requires a large insurer to underwrite it, the church often will choose
one parishioner to serve as agent for the purchase of insurance with the
understanding that the commission for writing that policy will be split
with other parishioners who also are insurance agents. In this way the
church avoids having to choose among its members upon whom to confer a particular benefit.
Id. (citations omitted).
18 Petitioner Gray was a private citizen at the time the agreement was struck. See
United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1293 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. McNally v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). The court noted, however, that in January,
1976, Gray was appointed by Governor Carroll to the position of Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293. While in this position,
"Gray had supervisory authority over [the insurance commissioner]. Gray also
served as Secretary of the governor's cabinet from January of 1977 until August of
1978." Id.
19 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877-78. The government pointed out that Seton
had "no office, no telephone, and no employees, and engaged in no business activity." Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 4 (citation omitted).
20 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293.
21 McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2877-78.
22 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293. The money was used to purchase two condominiums,
in Kentucky and Florida, as well as a station wagon. Id. Additionally, $38,500 was
turned over to Hunt's son. Id.

23

Id.
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fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud.2 4 The United States
alleged that Gray and McNally had intended to defraud Kentucky's citizens and government of their "right to have the Commonwealth's business conducted honestly," as well as to "obtain
...money..,

by means of false and fraudulent pretenses ... and
the concealment of facts."' 25 The violation allegedly occurred

when the insurance company writing the policies mailed a commission check to Wombwell. 26 The conspiracy charges arose by
virtue of the collaborative efforts of the petitioners. 27 The trial
court instructed the jury, inter alia, that it was not necessary to
find any pecuniary harm to the state to convict; only that, pursuant to a fiduciary duty28 owed the state and its citizens, the petitioners had effectively schemed to deny those citizens their
intangible rights,' such as the right to have [government function] honestly, impartially and free from corruption and official
misconduct.' '29
The jury convicted petitioners on both counts,3 0 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.3 '
Embracing the intangible rights rationale widely accepted by
other lower federal courts, 2 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
24 Id. at 1293-94. Hunt, also indicted for mail fraud, pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to three years in prison. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878.
25 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1294. The prosecution argued that the intent to defraud
arose through the petitioner's "failure to disclose their financial interest [in the
insurance agencies], even if state law did not require it, to other persons in the state
government whose actions could have been affected by [it]." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at
2882 n.9. The indictment further alleged that because of this non-disclosure, the
state and its citizens were defrauded of their right "to be made aware of all relevant
... facts ... when ... expanding [sic] the funds of the Commonwealth." Gray, 790
F.2d at 1293.
26 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1294.
27 Id.

28 The trial judge instructed the jury that this duty and its subsequent breach
could be found based on two possible scenarios. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878-79.
The first required finding that either or both Gray and McNally had aided and abetted Hunt, who had used his authority to direct commissions to a company in which
he had an undisclosed ownership interest. Id. at 2879. The second possibility was
that Gray, in his official government capacity, had supervisory authority over the
insurance purchased during the period that Seton, in which he had an undisclosed
ownership interest, had received commission payments, with McNally's involvement turning on whether he had aided and abetted Gray in this regard. Id.
29 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1294.
so Id.
31 Id. at 1298.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Girdner, 754 F.2d 877
(10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); United
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mail fraud statute extends to schemes where no one is divested of
tangible property.3 3 The court grounded its holding on the perceived inherent fiduciary characteristics of public service.3 4 Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari s5 and reversed
the petitioners' convictions, holding that the mail fraud statute
protects only tangible property rights.3 6
The original mail fraud statute,3 7 enacted during a recodification of the postal laws in 1872, was primarily intended to provide a tool by which the federal government could reach the
rapidly increasing number of swindles conducted through the
States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); United
States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d
988 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
33 Gray, 790 F.2d at 1295 (citing United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1364
(4th Cir.), aff'd en banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980)).
34 The court acknowledged the widely accepted principle that only one member
of the conspiracy need be a public fiduciary in order to maintain a violation of the
statute, and further that this role is implicated even when "an individual who has no
formal employment relationship with government... substantially participate[s] in
government operations so as to assume a fiduciary duty to the general citizenry."
Id. at 1295 (citing United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983)). This is because once endowed with the trust that
accompanies an influential connection with governance, it logically follows that use
of such a role for personal advantage is, in essence, a breach of the concomitant
duty to perform with integrity and pursue only the best interests of the state and its
citizens. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646-48 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). See also Comment, FederalProsecutionof Elected State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U.L. REV.
63, 64-65 (1978). Under these circumstances, tangible harm becomes irrelevant.
See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574
(1941). Shushan was an early case discussing the fiduciary aspect of public office.
The court noted:
A scheme to get a public contract on more favorable terms than would
likely be got otherwise by bribing a public official would not only be a
plan to commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a scheme to
defraud the public.... No trustee has more sacred duties than a public
official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an
[sic] one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud.
Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that both Gray, by
his actual official status, and Hunt, through his assignment of de facto control over
the insurance purchases, sufficiently participated in the governmental process to
sustain the guilty verdicts. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1296.
35 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
36 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987).
37 Act ofjune 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1982)).
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mails during that era. 38 Though containing language which focused primarily on the mailing element of the offense,3 9 the initial act proscribed "any scheme or artifice to defraud," as does its
modern version, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.40 Despite being amended five
times since its enactment, the substance of the mail fraud statute
has nonetheless generally remained the same. 4 ' The most significant change occurred in 1909, when the language "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
38 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879. During debates on the statute, its sponsor,
Representative Farnsworth, described a typical mail fraud scheme as follows:
They send out genuine specimens of fractional currency, and say to
their correspondents, "We can sell you so much of this money for so
much." In their circulars they may, perhaps, send a genuine twenty-five
or fifty cent currency note. The person receiving the circular may not be
particularly ignorant, but being somewhat greedy, he shows it to some
banker or broker, who, of course, pronounces it to be good money.
Thereupon, the countryman immediately sends to the address of the
agent, in New York, for instance, ten, fifteen, or twenty dollars, with an
order for so much as it may purchase. A box or package is sent to him,
perhaps, which upon being opened is found to contain waste paper,
sawdust, or may be bogus money .... The countryman who has done
this finds that through his avariciousness he has been betrayed into doing a very mean thing, and when caught, perhaps, does not like to make
any noise about it for fear his neighbors may laugh at him. Thus all
through the country thousands of innocent and unsophisticated people,
knowing nothing about the ways of these city thieves and robbers, are
continually fleeced and robbed, and the mails are made use of for the
purpose of aiding them in their nefarious designs.
CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). See also
Rakoff, supra note 3, at 779-82 (attributing the increase in swindles conducted
through the mails to the growth of the national economy after the end of the Civil
War).
39 Originally, in determining the punishment for a violation of the act, the court
was required to "proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the
abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent
scheme and device." Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
40 Section 301 provides in pertinent part:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or be effected ... by means of the post-office establishment of the United States ...shall, in and for executing such scheme
or artifice ... place any letter or packet in any such post-office ... such
person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as the court shall
direct ....
Id.
41 See Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (amended 1909); Act of
March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (amended 1948); Act ofJune 25, 1948,
ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763 (amended 1949); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 34,
63 Stat. 94 (amended 1970); Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
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pretenses, representations, or promises" was added. 4 2 It is upon
this portion of the statute that the intangible rights doctrine is
founded. 43 This 1909 amendment was prompted by Congress's
desire to codify the first Supreme Court decision broadly construing the statute's prohibition against frauds conducted
through the postal service.4 4
In Durland v. United States,4 5 the Court considered the predecessor to section 1341, and evaluated the defendant's contention
that the "scheme . . . to defraud" provision of the statute was
limited by the common law definition of fraud, such that the deceit must pertain to a past or present fact, as opposed to
promises with respect to the future.4 6 The Court declined to
limit the provision, explaining that a broad interpretation was
warranted in order to further the statute's purpose of prohibiting
misuse of the mails and protecting "the public against all such
intentional efforts to despoil. ' 47 Notwithstanding this broad interpretation of the act, no indication of its application beyond
48
tangible property rights was evident in the Durland opinion.
Since the codification of Durland, the essential elements of
the mail fraud statute have continued to be devising a scheme to
defraud and using the mails in furtherance of that scheme. 49 Beyond this, the gravamen of the offense in terms of the intent of
the criminal scheme within the reach of the federal statute is not
as readily gleaned from the wording of the act.50 The sparse legislative history and disjunctive phrasing of the activities censured
by the mail fraud act after the 1909 amendment have permitted
wide latitude in interpreting its provisions. 5 '
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
43 See Comment, supra note 8, at 569-70.
44 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896) (the Court's first interpretation of the mail fraud statute). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 570 (noting that
the key language of the decision also appears in the 1909 amendment).
45 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
46 Id. at 312. The defendant in Durland was convicted of participating in a
scheme involving the sale of fraudulent interest-bearing bonds. Id.
47 Id. at 313-14.
48 See id. at 312-15.
49 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Gregory v. United States,
253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail
Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 237 (1975) (outlining general rules applicable to the mail
fraud act).
50 See Morano, The Mail Fraud Statute: A ProcrusteanBed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
45, 55 (1980).
51 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
42
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Lower federal courts have uniformly adopted a broad construction of the mail fraud statute to bring a wide range of
schemes involving both public and private individuals within the
purview of the statute. 52 In all of these cases, the courts' rationale was premised on the existence of a fraudulent plan in which a
fiduciary duty was breached and correlative disloyalty displayed.53 The courts have achieved these results by finding that
the provisions of section 1341 encompass independent, mutually
exclusive species of frauds.54 Those schemes intending to cause
economic, "tangible" harm to the victim have been held forbid55
den by the latter phrase "or for obtaining money, property."
Those plans devised to violate individuals "intangible rights,
contrary to public policy and fail[ing] to measure up to accepted
moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play," have been
held to contravene the former, original language of the act.5 6
In the private sector, the courts have found this fiduciary
duty implicit in the nature of an employment relationship. 57 For
example, in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,58 the mail fraud
charge was based on a scheme in which a corporate defendant
had bribed a competitor's employee to obtain certain trade
secrets. 59 Notwithstanding the actual economic harm involved in
the case, 60 the court reasoned that because an employment relationship necessarily includes honest and loyal service, it follows
that tampering with that relationship is, in effect, "defrauding the
employer of a lawful right."' 61 As support for this conclusion, the

court quoted a much earlier decision which explained, "[i]f it is
52 See Rakoff, supra note 3, at 772.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1360-63 (4th Cir.), aff'd en
banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
See also Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) ("Whatever the limits to

[Congress'] power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that
it regards as contrary to public policy .... ). Accord Parr v. United States, 363 U.S.
370, 385 (1960). But see Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949)
(recognizing constructive frauds as outside the scope of the mail fraud act based on
an absence of an immoral act).
54 See Morano, supra note 50, at 48-49.
55 E.g., United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447

U.S. 928 (1980).
56 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1360.
57 See Hurson, supra note 6, at 428-29.

58 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
59 Id. at 678.
60 Id. As a result of this scheme, "certain experimental cakes of soap, secret

processes, formulas, facts and figures, etc., belonging to [the employer were]
turned over to Procter & Gamble Company." Id.
61 Id.
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his employer, and he is

made to do so,' that is fraud in the eye of the law." 6 2
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. George.63 In George, three defendants were convicted of
mail fraud for partaking in a scheme iegarding the purchase of
cabinets for use by the Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith).' A
cabinet buyer employed by Zenith solicited from only one bidder
and consequently received kickbacks from that supplier.65 The
arrangement was in patent violation of Zenith's express conflictof-interest policy. 66 The indictment alleged deprivations of both
money and property and of the "faithful performance of its
employee."

67

The defendants in George argued that since no direct evidence was presented at trial to show that the cost had been
passed on to Zenith, nor evidence of any preferential treatment
paid to the supplier, no scheme to defraud existed within the
scope of the mail fraud act. 68 The Seventh Circuit rejected these
arguments. 69 The court explained that no proof of actual injury
is necessary under section 1341.70 Moreover, the court held that
intent to deprive the employer of honest and loyal service is sufficient to sustain a violation under the statute. 7 ' According to the
court, this intent was sufficiently evidenced by the undisclosed
kickback payments. 2 With respect to the actual fraud charge, the
court found that a fraud had been perpetrated on Zenith.73
While acknowledging that "[n]ot every breach of every fiduciary
duty works a criminal fraud," the court nonetheless found that
Zenith had suffered "a very real and tangible harm" to the extent
it was deprived of the competitive bargaining edge in securing
the lowest possible price for needed goods.7 ' This injury re62 Id. at 678-79 (quoting Roxburgh v. M'Arthur, 3 Scot. Sess. (2d series) 556
(1841)).
63 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
64 George, 477 F.2d at 510.
65 Id. The payments were hidden by addressing false commission invoices to the
supplier from a third company through which the money was funneled. Id. at 51011.
66 Id. at 511.
67 Id. at 510.
68 See id. at 511-12.
69 Id. at 512.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 513-14.
72 Id. at 514.
73 Id. at 512.
74 Id. at 512-13 (footnote omitted).
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suited from the employee holding himself out as loyal and acting
in the best interests of Zenith, while failing to disclose the money
paid to him by the supplier.75
The mail fraud act has been widely used to combat similar
intangible frauds in the public arena.76 In the seminal case of
United States v. States, 77 the Eighth Circuit was confronted with appeals from convictions for mail fraud arising out of an intricate
enterprise through which the defendants, candidates for election
to local office, had used the mails to submit fictitious absentee
ballots. 78 Charged with scheming to defraud the public of "certain intangible political and civil rights," the defendants argued
that because no money or property was involved in the scheme,
no offense cognizable under the mail fraud statute had occurred. 79 This argument was based on a conjunctive reading of
the provisions of the mail fraud statute, such that the phrase
"scheme . . . to defraud" was modified by "[or] for obtaining

money or property."8 0 The defendants further maintained that
applying section 1341 to schemes of this nature was an intrusion
into the domain of state regulation, contravening traditional
principles of federalism.8 '
After a thorough examination of the wording of the mail
fraud act, as well as the available authority interpreting it, the
court concluded that "[t]he more natural construction . . . is to
view the two phrases independently. 8' 2 Consequently, the court
held that the intent of a forbidden scheme is not limited to the
See id. at 514.
See Rakoff, supra note 3. The author, a former United States attorney, extols
the virtues of the broad interpretation accorded section 1341, explaining:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute
is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinartand our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 1Ob-5, and call
the conspiracy law "darling," but we always come home to the virtues of
18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. It understands us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to
think we understand it.
Id. at 771 (footnotes omitted).
77 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
78 States, 488 F.2d at 762.
79 Id. at 763-65.
80 Id. at 763-64.
81 See id. at 766-67. The defendant-appellants argued that such a broad extension of the mail fraud act resulted in federal "policing" of state elections, and that
"Congress has never explicitly authorized such widespread intervention into state
affairs." Id.
82 Id. at 764.
75
76
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acquisition of money or property."' As support for this holding,
the court explained that the "[flaw puts its imprimatur on the
accepted moral standards and condemns conduct which fails to
match the 'reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of
the members of society.' "84 The court concluded that "any kind
or species of scheme or artifice to defraud is punishable in the
national5 courts .
[provided] the postal establishment is
used."

8

After States, the use of section 1341 as a vehicle to obtain
convictions of corrupt politicians greatly increased.86 Often
these cases involved high ranking officials and as a result were
the subject of much public attention and scrutiny.8 7 For exam8
ple, in United States v. Mandel,1
the Governor of Maryland and
others were charged and convicted under section 1341 of "defraud[ing] the citizens of the State of Maryland and her governmental departments . . . of the right to . . . disinterested and
honest government through bribery ... and concealment of ma-

terial information." 89 The government's evidence showed that
Governor Mandel had promoted certain pending racetrack legislation which was favorable to the interests of racetrack investors,
his associates and friends, in exchange for "financial and other
benefits." 90 The defendants argued that this prosecution was an
unconstitutional intrusion into the affairs of the state, and that
schemes of this sort, in which no one was deceived into parting
with tangible property, were not within the ambit of section
1341.91

Addressing the issue of tangible injury, the Fourth Circuit
observed that the question of whether bribery of public officials
can be prosecuted under this federal statute "has long since been
83 See
84 Id.
85 Id.

id.
(quoting Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)).
(quoting Gouled v. United States, 273 F. 506, 508 (2d Cir. 1921)).

86 See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 562 n.2.
87 See generally Comment, supra note 34 (analyzing the propriety of federal juris-

diction under the mail fraud act to prosecute local and state politicians).
88 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd en banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
89 Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1359-60 (footnote omitted).
90 Id. at 1355-57.

91 Id. at 1357. "Appellants cryptically state, '[n]o previous mail fraud prosecution has permitted conviction of a public official to rest upon the slim reed of a
federal prosecutor's untutored notion of what the public or the state should expect

by way of an ethical and honest performance of a state official's duties.' " Id.
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answered in the affirmative." ' 92 The court reasoned that to the
extent a bribed government official decides issues in favor of the
payor's special interest, the public is deprived of its entitlement
to impartial and honest service.93 Hence, the court of appeals
held that the allegations of bribery were prosecutable under the
mail fraud statute even absent economic injury.9 4 The court further concluded that the federalism argument was without merit,
noting the validity of federal jurisdiction over the postal system
which had been utilized in the bribery scheme.9 5
By far the broadest expansion of the intangible rights reading of section 1341 was its use in the prosecution of a private
citizen in United States v. Margiotta.96 In Margiotta, the Second Circuit imposed the same onus of public fiduciary status on a private
citizen by virtue of participation tantamount to dominance in the
affairs of local government.97 As a result, the intangible rights
doctrine was invoked to support a conviction for mail fraud. 98
Joseph Margiotta, chairman of the Republican Committee of
both Nassau County and Hempstead Township, Long Island, was
convicted of mail fraud for pursuit of a kickback scheme involving
the purchase of insurance for these public entities. 99 Evidence
adduced at trial portrayed Margiotta as a public patriarch with a
pervasive influence over the affairs of the local government." ° °
Id. at 1362.
Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976)). The
court traced the logic of this analysis as follows:
It is clear from... many.., cases that the fraud involved in the bribery
of a public official lies in the fact that the public official ... is not exercising his independent judgment in passing on official matters. A fraud is
perpetrated upon the public to whom the official owes fiduciary duties,
e.g., honest, faithful and disinterested service. When a public official
has been bribed, he breaches his duty of honest, faithful and disinterested service. While outwardly purporting to be exercising independent
judgment in passing on official matters, the official has been paid for his
decisions, perhaps without even considering the merits of the matter.
Thus, the public is not receiving what it expects and is entitled to, the
public official's honest and faithful service.
Id. (citation omitted).
94 See id. at 1362-63.
95 See id. at 1358.
96 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
97 Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 121-22.
98 Id. at 122.
99 Id. at 113.
100 Id. at 113-20. The indictment alleged that Margiotta formed a secret arrangement by which he caused a certain insurance agency to be designated the Broker of
Record for these bodies in return for the kickback of "a substantial portion of its
commissions in accordance with [his] instructions." Id. at 120.
92
93
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He used his position to compel the award of commissions earned
on the purchase of public insurance to his political associates.' l
Although this long-time practice was not forbidden by state
law, 0 2 the government nonetheless posited that it was a fraudulent kickback scheme, harmful to the integrity of the postal system.10 3 After one jury failed to reach a decision, a second jury
convicted Margiotta of use of the postal system to deprive and
defraud the town, county, and citizens of their right to have governmental affairs conducted honestly. 0 4
Recognizing that the key issue on appeal was one of first impression, a majority of the Second Circuit affirmed the mail fraud
convictions of Margiotta and his accomplices.' 0 5 With respect to
section 1341, the court cautioned against the dangerous repercussions to the democratic system, with its constant partisan tension, of "prosecut[ing for mail fraud] those who simply
participate in the affairs of government in an insubstantial
way.''t 6 Upon examination of the evidence relating to Margiotta's degree of involvement in government, the court concluded
that he had indeed stepped over the line of that "important distinction" between partisan affairs and the business of government and thus "dominated governmental affairs as a de facto
public leader.' 0 7 In affirming the convictions, the court embraced the intangible rights doctrine as a valid extension of the
mail fraud statute to Margiotta.' 0 8 Judge Winter, in an opinion in
which he concurred in part and dissented in part, criticized the
elastic application of section 1341 as a prophylactic measure to
reach "political disingenuousness.., beyond any colorable claim
of Congressional intent. '"109 The dissent also explained that the
majority's decision may validate random and capricious prosecu101 Id.
102 See id. at 124. The court explained that, even absent state laws against such
activities, "[t]he mail fraud statute was enacted to prohibit the use of the mails for
promoting schemes deemed contrary to federal public policy." Id.
103 See id.at 114-15.
104
105

Id. at 119.
Id. at 112-13.

106 Id.at 120. The court cautioned that "[sluch a rule would threaten to criminalize a wide range of conduct, from lobbying to political party activities, as to which
the public has no right to disinterested service." Id. at 122.
107 Id. The court plainly stated, "we do not believe that a formal employment
relationship, that is, public office, should be a rigid prerequisite to a finding of
fiduciary duty in the public sector." Id. (citing United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d
656, 663-64 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975)).
108

See id. at 123.

109 Id.at 139 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tions or encourage its use by ambitious prosecutors to gain public recognition and praise. 110
In response to the trend of expanding the scope of the mail
fraud act, the United States Supreme Court recently decided McNally v. United States."' In an opinion authored by Justice
White," 2 the Court unequivocally rejected the intangible rights
doctrine as a basis for federal prosecution under the mail fraud
act." l3 The Court read the provisions of the act conjunctively,
limiting the reach of section 1341 to those schemes involving
concrete injury. 1 4 Initially, Justice White observed that the statute clearly and expressly protects property rights, but makes no
reference to other abstract, intangible rights." 5 In an effort to
discern which of two plausible constructions of the statute was
more in accord with the intent of Congress when the crucial
"money or property" language was added," 6 Justice White undertook 7a classic analysis of the history of the mail fraud
statute.''

Justice White began his inquiry by looking to the available
10 See id. at 140, 143 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Winter voiced similar concerns in a later opinion, in which the concept of
fiduciary fraud was applied to corporate directors and officers to sustain violations
of the analogous wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See United States v. Siegel,
717 F.2d 9, 10-13 (2d Cir. 1983). Thejudge noted that "[aldequate notice to those
affected by such elastic concepts is simply not possible," and concluded that, by
virtue of the court's decision, "a crime is created which by its nature will be prosecuted infrequently and in a highly selective manner." Id. at 24 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, Judge Winter posited that "[i]f
judges perceive a need for a catch-all federal common law crime, the issue should
be addressed explicitly with some recognition of the dangers, rather than continue
an inexorable expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes under the pretense of
merely discharging Congress' will." Id.
111 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
112 Id. at 2877. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackman, Powell, and Scalia joined in the majority opinion. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, joined in part by Justice O'Connor. Id.
113 See id. at 2881.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2879.
116 See id. at 2880.
117 See id. at 2879. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05, 20-23 (4th ed. 1984). In an early English case, Lord Blackburn stated
the general rule regarding statutory construction as follows:
In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by the
words used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to
know what that intention is without inquiring further, and seeing what
the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used,
and what was the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the
person using them had in view; for the meaning of the word varies according to the circumstances with respect to which they were used.
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legislative history of the mail fraud act."" The Justice noted that
statements made in the legislative history indicated that the original impetus behind the promulgation of the statute was the need
to create a means of protecting the public from postal frauds in
which they were swindled out of money or property." 9 Moreover, Justice White concluded that the 1909 amendment to the
120
act implicitly supported this finding of congressional intent.
He observed that the amendment was undisputedly a codification
of the Supreme Court's Durland holding, which explained that
the statute should be construed broadly to blanket " 'everything
designed to defraud by representations.' ",121 Accordingly, the
Court stated that the fact that Congress chose the more specific
and limited language of "or for obtaining money or property"
logically gives rise to an assumption that these specific tangible
interests were what the legislature was addressing. 12 2 Absent
other substantive amendments, 123 however, Justice White acknowledged that it remained tenable that Congress had chosen
the disjunctive "or" as a purposeful method of creating two separate, distinct proscriptions, the former unlimited by the material
requirement of the latter. 24 The Court, therefore, turned to the
common law definition and historical understanding of the term
"to defraud" in further efforts to ascertain legislative intent.12 5
Justice White noted that in an earlier case the Court had defined the words "to defraud" as "wronging one in his property
Id. at 21 (citing River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, LR 2 AC 743 (1877)).
Likewise, as early as 1584, Lord Coke explained:
And it was resolved by them, that for the full and true interpretation of
all statutes in general .

.

. four things are to be discerned and consid-

ered:-ist. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did
not provide? 3rd. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? And 4th. The true
reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and evasions for continuance of
the mischief ... and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act ....
Id. (citing Heydon's Case, 3 Co Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584)).
118 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
"19 Id.
120 Id. at 2880. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
121 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880 (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306,
313 (1896)).
122 See id.
123
124
125

See id. at 2880 n.6.
Id. at 2880.
Id.
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rights . . . usually . . . depriv[ing the victim of] something of
value."' 26 TheJustice also observed that there was no indication
of an intended departure from this prevailing understanding of
the term of art in the mail fraud act.' 27 Accordingly, the majority
summarily held the 1909 amendment to be solely an attempt to
clarify the fact that fraudulent future promises directed toward
the property of another and effectuated through the postal service were also proscribed by the statute. 2 '
To further support this essentially novel limitation on federal jurisdiction under the mail fraud act, the Court resorted to
longstanding canons of statutory construction. 129 Justice White
explained that in cases where two rational readings of a criminal
statute are feasible, the more lenient alternative must prevail unless Congress has clearly indicated otherwise. 13 The majority
further observed that when presented with statutes such as section 1341, which extend federal jurisdiction into matters usually
inaccessible, implications of privacy and state sovereignty make
the issue particularly significant.' l 3 Justice White implicitly recognized federalism concerns by explaining that the broader interpretation of the mail fraud statute "leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state
13 2
officials."'
The majority's analysis of the mail fraud act concluded with a
virtually defensive challenge to Congress, explaining that if it
' 33
"desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."'
Turning to the facts presented in the instant case, Justice White
carefully reviewed the jury instructions for any reference to the
requisite tangible harm. 13 4 Finding the element of pecuniary injury absent, the Court reversed the petitioners' convictions and
3 5
remanded the case.1
126 Id. at 2880-81 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188
(1924)) (footnote omitted).
127 Id. at 2881.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)).
131 See generally Comment, supra note 34, at 66 ("analyz[ing] the propriety of escalating federal involvement in state and local political corruption cases").
132 McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2881.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2882.
135 Id. The majority pointed out that the government's belated assertion on ap-
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In a dissenting opinion joined in part by Justice
O'Connor,' 3 6 Justice Stevens vehemently opposed the action
taken by the majority of the Court." 7 The Justice criticized the
majority's decision as incongruent with the abundant judicial
opinions which have reached the opposite result.' 3 8 To reinforce
this position, Justice Stevens surveyed the various public and private contexts in which there had been successful prosecutions
under section 1341, and observed a common reliance on the in39
tangible rights theory. 1

Addressing the construction of the mail fraud statute
adopted by the majority, Justice Stevens found it "senseless" in
light of the original purpose of the act.' 40 Even if, arguendo, the
term "to defraud" was permanently restricted by an originally
constrained definition, the dissent could not rationally conclude
that Congress had nonetheless remained tolerant of schemes
which threatened to taint both the postal service and, in the case
of political corruption, the institution of democratic society.' 4'
Conversely, Justice Stevens interpreted the various amendments
to section 1341 as attempts by the legislature to broaden the pur142
view of the statute.

In support of its position, the dissent offered authority for a
broad interpretation of the mail fraud act, as well as several definitions of the term "fraud" which differed from those noted in
the majority's opinion. 14 The Justice then reviewed 18 U.S.C.
peal that Wombwell was defrauded of tangible property by the petitioners could
not cure the fatally defective charge to the jury. Id.
136 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in parts I, II, and III of
the dissent. Id.
137 See id. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 See id. at 2885, 2890 (Stevens,J, dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not join in
part IV of the dissent, in which Justice Stevens stated, "[t]he quality of this Court's
work is most suspect when it stands alone, or virtually so, against a tide of wellconsidered opinions... [elven if I were not so persuaded, I could not join a rejection of such a longstanding, consistent interpretation of a federal statute." Id. at
2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2883-84 nn.l-5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 2886-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice noted, "[diuring the past
century, both Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly placed their
stamps of approval on expansive use of the mail fraud statute. Indeed, each of the
five legislative revisions of the statute has served to enlarge its coverage." Id. (citing Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 772, 772-73
(1980)).
143 Id. at 2887-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice observed that "fraud...
'applie[s] to every artifice made use of by one person for the purpose of deceiving
another . . .any cunning, deception, or artifice used to circumvent, cheat, or

1989]

NOTE

423

§ 371, an analogous federal statute criminalizing conspiracies
against the United States, which also contained the "to defraud"
phrase. 144 Justice Stevens surveyed the interpretative history of
the statute and found that it had repeatedly been used to redress
intangible harms.14 He observed that the majority opinion summarily distinguished between 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 in a footnote based on the limited province of section 371
to actions against the United States.146 According to the dissent,
however, this distinction becomes "ludicrous" in light of the similar conduct the legislature addressed in promulgating each
statute.147
Justice Stevens further maintained that the majority's reliance on the doctrine of lenity was erroneous. 148 He explained
that prior judicial decisions have effectively mooted this point by
removing any 'ambiguity in the meaning of the "scheme . . .to
defraud" provision. 149 The dissent posited that notwithstanding
the possibility of "some overly expansive applications of section
1341 in the past, '150 the petitioners in McNally "knew that it
would be unlawful to place Kentucky's insurance coverage with
an agent who would secretly make hundreds of thousands of doluse of petitioners, their relatives,
lars available for the private
15 1
and their paramours."'

The Supreme Court's holding in McNally is seemingly a clear
and absolute rejection of the theory that violation of the federal
criminal law may be based on schemes which make use of the
mails to contravene the intangible rights of others. 152 Future allegations of schemes which defraud persons of their "right to
honest and faithful government" are effectively precluded by this
deceive another.'" Id. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 J. STORY, EQUITY
186, 189-90 (1870)). The Justice continued that " '[flraud in its
elementary common law sense of deceit.., includes the deliberate concealment of
material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation.' " Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1987)).
144 See id. at 2886. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "If two or
more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof. . . each shall be fined . . .or
imprisoned ...or both." Id.
145 McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. See also id. at 2881 n.8.
147 Id. at 2886-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 2889-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

JURISPRUDENCE §

151
152

Id.
Id. at 2881.
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decision. 5 3 Several questions left unresolved by the majority
opinion, however, may mitigate the apparently comprehensive
1 54
effects of the McNally decision.

One issue that remains unclear from the McNally Court's
holding pertains to the requisite causation that the government
must plead. Because reversal of the convictions in McNally
turned on the absolute lack of any reference to tangible harm in
the jury charge, 15 1 sufficiency of the evidence was not discussed
by the Court. Thus the procedural question remaining is the nature of the tangible injury that must be alleged in future prosecutions to make out a prima facie case of mail fraud. Whether
actual, proximate loss of money or property by a principal must
be asserted, or if charges of implicit deprivations consonant with
traditional principles of agency1 56 will suffice, is a pragmatic con153 Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

See, e.g., infra note 155.
McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882. The Court explains, "there was no charge and
the jury was not required to find that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of
any money or property ....
Although the government now relies in part on the
assertion petitioners obtained property [fraudulently from Wombwell], there was
nothing in the jury charge that required such a finding." Id. Similarly, with respect
to allegations of more remote injury caused by the fraudulent scheme, the Court
noted, "[iut was not charged that in the absence of the alleged scheme the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium .... Nor was the jury charged that to
convict it must find that the Commonwealth was deprived of control over how its
money was spent." Id.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 383-84 (E.D. La. 1969);
United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 716 (S.D. Fla. 1962). See Morano, supra
note 50, at 60-64. Professor Morano explains:
Although the courts generally deny that conviction for fiduciary
fraud requires proof of pecuniary or other property loss, they nevertheless find that whenever an employee receives kickbacks, the employer is
in fact defrauded to that extent. The argument is that if the party doing
business with a company is willing to pay kickbacks to its employee, then
this party is willing to enter into an agreement with the company at least
as favorable to the firm as a bestowal of the discount on the company
itself. Thus, the self-serving employee is unjustly enriched by the
kickback.
Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted). Professor Morano noted that Judge Learned Hand
had taken a similar position with respect to the mail fraud statute by stating:
A man is none the less cheated out of his property, when he is induced to part with it by fraud, because he gets a quid pro quo of equal
value. It may be impossible to measure his loss by the gross scales available to a court, but he has suffered a wrong; he has lost his chance to
bargain with the facts before him. That is the evil against which the
statute is directed.
Id. at 62-63 n.53 (quoting United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932)). See M. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 388, 24-25 (1987).
154

155
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cern implicating the ultimate ramifications of the decision. 157
The Court's careful scrutiny of the jury charge for any element of
tangible injury sanctions the inference that even the most remote
causation of some concrete loss will sustain any resulting convictions.' 58 Moreover, whether any money or property was actually
divested in 59a given case presents a fact question for jury
resolution. '

Another ambiguous issue which arises as a result of the McNally decision is the general state of the theory of fiduciary fraud,
60
which has applications outside the rejected mail fraud context.
Because of the narrow analysis the Court employs to reach its
decision, McNally does not necessarily preclude adherence to this
principle in other areas of the law. 16 ' The holding is essentially
62
premised on the Court's finding of likely congressional intent,1
with collateral reliance on the doctrine of lenity. 163 No universal
principal is articulated by the majority regarding other federal
criminal statutes. Clearer language or more informative legislative history might mandate a finding that Congress intended to
reach those situations in which an influential position is misused
and results in unjust enrichments. 64
Similarly, the Court's presumption, "for the purposes of this
action," that Hunt was a state officer rests on the concomitant
fiduciary duties transferred through assumption of de facto con157 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledges that the decision may
possibly be mitigated by rules of agency law. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890-91 n.10
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice explained:
When a person is being paid a salary for his loyal services, any
breach of that loyalty would appear to carry with it some loss of money
to the employer-who is not getting what he paid for. Additionally, "[ilf
an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty
to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its
proceeds, to the principal." This duty may fulfill the Court's "money or
property" requirement in most kickback schemes.
Id. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 403 (1958)).
158 See supra note 135.
159 See id.
160 See generally Baxter, supra note 1, at 322 (identifying four federal statutes employed to prosecute local corruption: the Mail Fraud Act, the Hobbs Act, the Travel
Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)).
161 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2875.
162 See id. at 2881.
163 See id. See also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76 (1820)(ambiguous criminal statutes construed strictly).
164 See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd en banc in relevant
part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
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trol of a government function. 165 Admittedly, not discussing an
issue does not necessarily imply acquiescence to its present judicial standing; nonetheless, the bypass of a ripe opportunity may
provide some insight into the tenor of the Court. 6 6 It should be
acknowledged, however, that doing so might have diluted discussion of the core issue presented, and thus the Court chose to forsake consideration of ancillary issues.
The McNally decision rejects convictions for "intangible
rights" deprivations in both the public and the private sector, 167
but gives no indication of how these sorts of activities will be discovered and defeated in the future. If taken to its logical extreme
by federal courts as imposing strict evidentiary burdens, the decision will preclude federal investigation of any but those schemes
in which clear pecuniary harm is evinced. 6 8 While this is an unlikely result, particularly in the public context, in theory the onus
then falls upon Congress and the state legislatures to forbid this
69
type of unethical conduct.1

Arguably, state legislatures are best suited to combat local
political corruption. The federal interest in protecting the integrity of the postal system, albeit strong, pales in comparison to the
interest states have in honest politicians. 170 Furthermore, the
165 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
166 However, a good example of the need to proceed cautiously in this regard is
the McNally case itself, where years of denial of certiorari led those concerned to
infer tacit acquiescence to intangible rights prosecutions for mail fraud on the part
of the Supreme Court. See Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F. Supp. 814, 821-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
167 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
168 See Hurson, supra note 6, at 432-35. The author suggests that the extensive
application of section 1341 in the past had been a functional response to the methodology of federal criminal investigations. Id. The tangential approach to criminal
prosecutions lends some insight into future investigations as a result ofMcNally. Id.
169

Id.

170 See Comment, supra note 34, at 67-68. The author explains:
The federal interest in punishing crime of local concern .. . even
where local authorities demonstrably are unwilling or unable to intervene, is .

.

. tenuous ....

[T]he conduct "poses no threat to Federal

Institutions or operations or to anything for which the Federal government has any special responsibility ..
"
Federal prosecution of elected state officials for mail fraud is a
prime example ....

Even the most cursory examination of cases in this

area reveals that the use of the mails, in itself a "neutral activity," is
merely the jurisdictional basis upon which federal prosecution has been
predicated.
Id. at 67-68 (quoting Abrams, Consultant's Report ofJurisdiction:Chapter 2, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 33,
33 (1970)).
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postal system is usually incidental to the success of the fraudulent
scheme. A clever conspirator could easily forego the postal service to evade federal jurisdiction altogether. Conversely, open
and ethical government officials are of fundamental concern to
the individual states, which will presumably take action to fill the
void left by the McNally decision.' 7 1 Legislators in our democratic representative system are ever alert to the needs of their
constituencies, who ultimately suffer the consequences of corrupt
politicians. In the private sector, self-policing and civil actions
for damages provide alternatives to federal investigations, perhaps the route
preferred by companies victimized by unfaithful
17 2
employees.

The McNally decision will undoubtedly prompt critical commentary, particularly for its myopic reliance on legislative intent. 1' Nonetheless, further analysis of several other issues
implicated by the intangible rights doctrine compels a similar result. One such issue is the legitimacy of using the criminal justice
system as a tool to punish conduct, albeit unethical and immoral,
which results in no tangible loss to any verifiable victim. 174 The

causation element of convictions for deprivations for the right to
honest government is so stretched as to be virtually nonexistent.
The victims are often unaware of being any worse off as a result
of the scheme. Moreover, viewing the mailing component of the
scheme as a perversion of the integrity
of the postal service is so
75
obscure as to appear illusory. 1

Further concerns surrounding the intangible rights reading
of section 1341 revolve around constitutional issues. 176 Often
those indicted under the intangible rights theory were aware that
their activities did not contravene state law, but usually had no
knowledge of any violation of federal law. Further, schemes like
the ones involved in Margiotta and McNally were repeatedly sanc171 See Comment, supra note 34, at 73-74. The author raises several possible detriments to federal intervention into this arena, such as a chilling of "internal state
efforts at reform" through increasing reliance on the federal government to police
state politics. Id.
172 But see Hurson, supra note 6, at 454 nn.252-53 (outlining the possible risks of
self-policing fiduciary breaches in the private sector).
173 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
174 See Morano, supra note 50, at 81-82; Baxter, supra note 1, at 343-45.
175 See Hurson, supra note 6, at 450-53.
176 See generally Baxter, supra note 1 (identifying several constitutional issues
which arise when statutes such as the mail fraud act are construed broadly, leaving
great discretion in the hands of federal prosecutors).
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tioned by the political party in power. 77 Instances such as these
implicate serious questions about the requisite definiteness of the
criminal justice system, and the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process. 178 Similarly, because the intangible
rights doctrine affords the executive branch great discretion to
selectively prosecute a vast range of fraudulent schemes, the absence of express congressional authorization poses serious separation of powers considerations. 7 0 These issues are mooted by
the Court's decision in McNally, yet the doctrine might have been
repudiated on these grounds as well.
The McNally decision evinces an intent by the Supreme
Court to put an end to the practice of using unclear statutory
language to expand the scope of the federal criminal law into areas previously reserved to the individual states.'8 0 By resoundingly rejecting the intangible rights doctrine, the Court
"reestablished the historical limitations Congress had placed on
mail fraud prosecutions,"l 8 ' and foreshadowed consistent rulings
with regard to other statutes which intrude into the jurisdiction
of the states themselves. By limiting the statute to schemes which
use the mails to defraud others of their money or tangible property, the Court replaces the sanctions of federal law for misuse of
the mails on those clearly entitled to its encumbrance, "thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving
1' 82
and fleecing the innocent people in the country.'
Sarah E. McCandless
177 See text accompanying supra notes 14-23; and 99-104.
178

See, Morano, supra note 50, at 76-82.

179 See Baxter, supra note 1, at 334-36.

[T]he function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of
[the] words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature .... Whatever
temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.
Id. at 334 (quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 533 (1947)).
180 See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
181 Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F. Supp. 814, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
182 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870)(remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.

